Uncle Sucker: Why U.S. Efforts at Defense Burdensharing Fail - Recommendations for PolicymakersSince roughly 1960, the United States has averaged about 36 percent of allied GDP but more than 61 percent of allied defense spending. ^^ The only way to produce more equitable burdensharing is to make allies doubt the strength of the U.S. commitment: the stronger the belief in the U.S. commitment, the harder it is to get allies to defend themselves. Unless policymakers fundamentally change their approach to alliances, there is little hope that defense burdens can be spread more equitably.Cato InstituteCATO_a17b77a0-6df4-11df-92e3-6a267a64ea2aJustin LoganAuthor ~ Justin Logan is the director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He is an expert on U.S. grand strategy, international relations theory, and American foreign policy. His current research focuses on the shifting balance of power in Asia—specifically with regard to China—and the limited relevance of the Middle East to U.S. national security.PolicymakersPolicymakers should do several things to force allies and partners to take on a larger share of the burden of their defense. These fall into three categories: institutions, military deployments, and diplomatic signals.Allies defend themselves_5c44eb22-bd54-11ed-a668-386ffa82ea00To produce more equitable burdensharing of defense spending_5c44ec76-bd54-11ed-a668-386ffa82ea00DefenseAlliancesBurdensharingEquityInstitutionsMake demands about the institutions governing U.S. alliances_5c44ed52-bd54-11ed-a668-386ffa82ea001U.S. AlliesFirst, the institutions that govern U.S. alliances are old, but U.S. relative power means they must respond to demands—not meek suggestions—from Washington. Washington should begin making demands.EuropeGet Europe off the security dole_5c44ee6a-bd54-11ed-a668-386ffa82ea001.1European AlliesU.S. PolicymakersUkraineIn the wake of Russia’s dismal performance bullying its smaller, weaker neighbor Ukraine, and the large dent that Ukraine has put in Russian armor and infantry, it has become clear that Russia cannot defeat Europe’s larger, more powerful countries.EurasiaIf the aim of U.S. policy in Europe is merely ensuring that no one country can dominate Eurasia—achieving “regional hegemony” in international relations jargon—that objective requires exactly zero U.S. exertion.Kiel Institute for the World EconomyOne can see both the phenomenon of unequal burdensharing and its consequences in the disparate costs borne by the United States and European countries in arming and attempting to shore up Ukraine’s position as it defends itself. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy’s Ukraine Support Tracker, as of this writing, the United States has provided 72 percent of military aid to Ukraine and 59 percent of overall aid to the country.EuropeansEuropeans found themselves “almost bystanders in a crisis that might result in a large‐​scale Russian invasion of Ukraine or a new divide in Europe.” ^^ A North American country has taken the initiative for dealing with a European problem, despite the fact that NATO Europe has more at stake than the United States and has a GDP roughly equivalent to it. In Ukraine, the Europeans, savvily, have passed the buck yet again. The Americans, out of profligacy and inertia, have caught it.Getting Europe, in particular, off the security dole should be an important task for U.S. policymakers. With little prospect that the United States can dominate the security environments in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia simultaneously without massive increases in the defense budget, and with little sign that massive increases in the defense budget are forthcoming, savings become more attractive. If spending taxpayer dollars on Europe’s defense is not merely unfair but also unnecessary, it becomes doubly lamentable.NATOPublicly announce that the U.S. has no intention of supporting any further expansion of the NATO alliance_5c44ef3c-bd54-11ed-a668-386ffa82ea001.2NATOUkraineGeorgiaFinlandSwedenNATO Member‐​StatesU.S. policymakers should publicly announce that they have no intention of supporting any further expansion of the NATO alliance. This would send shockwaves through Europe, making it clear that U.S. attention to Europe is likely to wane. It would also make it clear that the United States does not have any intention of making security guarantees to Ukraine or Georgia similar to NATO’s Article 5—the collective defense provision of the North Atlantic Treaty. This would also likely make the weaker, more vulnerable NATO member‐​states seek more cooperation from major European countries as well as asymmetric capabilities of their own.Commander for EuropeInsist that the Europeans must name the next Supreme Allied Commander for Europe_5c44f004-bd54-11ed-a668-386ffa82ea001.3Supreme Allied Commander for EuropeTo drive this point home, U.S. policymakers should also make it clear that the next Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) will not be an American, and that the Europeans must decide on a European commander. Since the alliance’s inception, the SACEUR has been an American, with his deputy being a European. This gets things backward. Europe should be in the driver’s seat for European security. Once the Europeans settle on a candidate, the U.S. president should make it clear that he will nominate that person and offer to make his or her deputy an American.Military DeploymentsPublicly reevaluate U.S. overseas deployments_5c44f0ea-bd54-11ed-a668-386ffa82ea002GermanyU.S. TroopsSecond, where the United States deploys and bases troops has a significant impact on allies’ perceptions about U.S. willingness to fight on their behalf and, by extension, what they need to do for their own defense. Policymakers should publicly reevaluate U.S. overseas deployments.U.S. TroopsResume the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany_5c44f1f8-bd54-11ed-a668-386ffa82ea002.1President TrumpTrump had moved to withdraw roughly 12,000 servicemembers from Germany, redeploying some elsewhere in Europe and bringing some home. Biden paused, then rescinded that move on taking office.Chancellor Olaf ScholzDespite these deployments, after the start of the Ukraine war, Europeans were shaken from their slumber. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced a Zeitenwende, translated as a “watershed,” or the change of an era. Scholz announced a €100 billion fund to spend on German defense over the next four years, and that Germany would thereafter meet the 2 percent of GDP spending target on military spending. The measures had support from large majorities of the German public in all the polling done on the announcement.Eastern EuropeHowever, in the intervening months, things changed. The Biden administration sent 20,000 more troops to Eastern Europe and announced new initiatives that it would be taking on behalf of European security.Biden AdministrationIt supported the expansion of NATO to Finland and Sweden. In other words, it recentered European security on the United States.FinlandSwedenGermanyShortly thereafter, Germany announced that it would be cutting defense spending. The €100 billion fund would serve mainly as an accounting gimmick to obscure this fact. By 2026, at the end of the four‐​year period covered by the €100 billion, Germany would be spending less on defense than it did in 2022.75 This phenomenon, where a crisis erupts, European states get good press for doing more, then both the crisis and the doing more fade away, characterizes how efforts to distribute defense burdens have worked historically. It is time for the United States to wise up.U.S. TroopsResuming the withdrawal of troops from Germany would deliver a shock to Europe in general but to Germany in particular, hopefully reinvigorating the renewed sense of purpose that surrounded the launch of the Zeitenwende in the first place.A second way to press the issue is by resuming the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany that was initiated under Trump and rescinded by Biden before the war in Ukraine.Diplomatic SignalsMuddy the signals the U.S. sends about where and under what circumstances it is willing to fight for its allies’ interests_5c44f2d4-bd54-11ed-a668-386ffa82ea003U.S. AlliesFinally, the United States can muddy the signals it sends about where and under what circumstances it is willing to fight for its allies’ interests.Interests & TreatiesStop reassuring allies that their most expansive definitions of their interests are covered under their treaties with the United States_5c44f496-bd54-11ed-a668-386ffa82ea003.1U.S. AlliesEuropeAsiaJapanWith respect to Japan, for example, Obama was quick to assert that the Senkaku Islands, a small group of uninhabited islands disputed with China, were covered by the mutual defense treaty with the United States. While Obama’s supporters would argue that this move reassured the Japanese about the strength of the U.S. commitment to their security, the way to elicit Japanese exertion is to arouse Japanese anxiety. A country that is completely reassured is also completely lacking in drive to increase its own defense efforts.The third way that the United States could force greater burdensharing in Europe as well as Asia would be to stop reassuring allies that their most expansive definitions of their interests are covered under their treaties with the United States.Allied ContributionsRequire the Defense Department to report to Congress on allied contributions to the common defense_5c44f586-bd54-11ed-a668-386ffa82ea003.2CongressCongress should help force the issue.U.S. Department of DefenseFrom the 1980s until the early 2000s, the Defense Department was required every four years to submit to Congress a report entitled “Allied Contributions to the Common Defense.” Although this normally involved DOD acting as lawyer for U.S. allies and explaining that if you change methodologies, you can see our allies are actually doing quite a lot, it provided fodder for discussion in Congress about burdensharing both in NATO and in U.S. alliances in Asia.There has been an effort to reinstate the report in the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act; as of this writing, it is unclear whether that will remain in the bill.BurdensharingExamine burdensharing in NATO and other U.S. alliances_5c44f680-bd54-11ed-a668-386ffa82ea003.3CongressThere is also precedent for Congress to examine burdensharing in NATO and other U.S. alliances. The 1988 House Armed Services Committee Defense Burdensharing Panel issued a report stating “in the strongest possible terms that Europeans had better be prepared to defend their own territory without a large‐​scale U.S. ground commitment, because that commitment cannot be guaranteed forever.” It suggested further that “the major reason the United States is shouldering a disproportionate share of the defense burden is that … [a]s long as Americans pay most of the cost and assume most of the risks and responsibilities for the defense of the free world, the allies will be prepared to let the United States do so.” Congress should play hardball with U.S. allies, on behalf of the U.S. taxpayers, who pay for the expansive visions of the U.S. foreign policy elite.U.S. AlliesNATOU.S. Alliances2023-03-072023-03-08https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/uncle-suckerOwenAmburOwen.Ambur@verizon.net