

About CENTCOM

CENTCOM's AOR (AREA-OF-RESPONSIBILITY) covers 21 nations in the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and the strategic waterways that surround them.

Prior to the 2008 UCP, CENTCOM had seven African nations in its AOR. When AFRICOM was established, all but Egypt were transferred from CENTCOM to AFRICOM. Nations in the CENTCOM AOR share borders with nations in the AFRICOM, EUCOM and INDO-PACOM AORs.

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U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM)

Description:

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) was established Jan. 1, 1983. As its name implies, USCENTCOM covers the "central" area of the globe located between the European, Africa and Indo-Pacific Commands.

Stakeholder(s):

USCENTCOM Leaders

Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. :

Commander / General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr. is the Commander, United States Central Command. ~ A native of Birmingham, Alabama, upon graduation from The Citadel in 1979, Gen McKenzie was commissioned into the Marine Corps and trained as an infantry officer. He has commanded at the platoon, company, battalion, Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and component levels. As a LtCol, he commanded First Battalion, Sixth Marines. As the Commanding Officer of the 22d MEU (SOC), he led the MEU on combat deployments to Afghanistan in 2004 and Iraq in 2005-06. In 2006-07 he served as the Military Secretary to the 33rd and 34th Commandants of the Marine Corps. In July 2007, upon promotion to BGen, he served on the Joint Staff as a Deputy Director of Operations within the National Military Command Center. In June 2008, he was selected by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be the Director of the Chairman's New Administration Transition Team (CNATT). In this capacity, he coordinated the efforts of the Joint Staff and the combatant commands in preparing for and executing a wartime transition of administrations. In June 2009, he reported to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul, Afghanistan to serve as the Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) for Stability. Upon his return from Afghanistan, in July 2010 he was assigned as the Director, Strategy, Plans, and Policy (J-5) for the U.S. Central Command. In August 2012, he reported to Headquarters Marine Corps to serve as the Marine Corps Representative to the Quadrennial Defense Review. In June 2014, he was promoted to LtGen and assumed command of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command. In October 2015, he was assigned to the Joint Staff to serve as the Director, J-5, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff. In July 2017, he was named the Director, Joint Staff. Gen McKenzie was promoted to his current rank and assumed command of U.S. Central Command in March 2019. Gen McKenzie is an honors graduate of the Armor Officer Advanced Course, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Warfighting. He was selected as a CMC Fellow in 1999, and served as a Senior Military Fellow within the Institute for National Strategic

Studies at the National Defense University. He has a Masters in Teaching with a concentration in History.

James Malloy :

Deputy Commander / Vice Admiral James Malloy is a native of Silver Spring, Maryland and a 1986 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He holds a Master of Science in Systems Technology (Command, Control and Communications) from the Naval Post Graduate School; a Master of Science in National Security Strategy from the National War College and a Master of Health Sciences in Emergency and Disaster Management from Touro University. His sea tours include assignments onboard USS Deyo (DD 989), USS Fahrion (FFG 22) and USS Benfold (DDG 65). He deployed in command of both USS Falcon (MHC 59) and USS Pinckney (DDG 91), guiding Pinckney through her maiden deployment. He commanded Destroyer Squadron 50 as commander, Middle East Force (CTF 55) and commander, Coalition Task Group 152.1 operating at sea and from naval command centers in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. Ashore, Malloy served as the Navy theater missile defense officer and commander in chief operations briefer at U.S. Central Command (J3) in Tampa, Florida. Following the 9/11 terror attack, he established U.S. Naval Forces Central Command Friendly Forces Coordination Cell in Bahrain, as deputy for the operational liaison staff. Other staff assignments include flag aide to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/U.S. 5th Fleet in Bahrain; initial requirements officer for the Littoral Combat Ship on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, Surface Warfare Directorate (N86); head, Washington Placement Branch at Naval Personnel Command (PERS 441) and assistant deputy director, Politico-Military Affairs in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J5) on the Joint Staff. As a flag officer, his tours include deputy director of operations, U.S. Central Command (J3); commander, Carrier Strike Group 10, deploying with USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) to U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command areas of responsibility in support of Operation Inherent Resolve; vice director for operations, the Joint Staff (J3); deputy chief of naval operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy (N3/N5); and commander, U.S. Naval Forces, U.S. Central Command, U.S. 5th Fleet, Combined Maritime Forces.

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Stakeholders (continued)

Malloy began serving as deputy commander, U.S. Central Command September 21, 2020.

Patrick D. Frank :

Chief of Staff | Major General Patrick D. Frank is the Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command. ~ MG Frank graduated from St. Bonaventure University and was commissioned as a U.S. Army Infantry Officer. Throughout his career, he has served in a variety of command and staff assignments. His previous assignments include: Commanding General of the Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Polk; Deputy Commanding General and Acting Senior Commander of 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas; Executive Officer to the Commander ISAF Resolute Support; Executive Officer to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army; Commander of the 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team "Spartans," 10th Mountain Division - deployed in the surge of forces to Kandahar, Afghanistan for Operation Enduring Freedom XII-XIII; 1st Infantry Division G-3; Commander of 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry "Black Lions," 4th IBCT, 1st Infantry Division - deployed to Baghdad as a part of the surge during Operation Iraqi Freedom-V; Aide to the Secretary of the Army; Deputy G-3 and Brigade S-3 in the 101st Airborne Division in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom-I; company commands in the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York where he also deployed as a staff officer in support of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and a tour with the 3rd Infantry Division, Germany, in support of Operation Desert Storm. MG Frank earned a Bachelor of Arts in Finance; a Master's Degree in Public Administration from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University; a Master's Degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College; and a Master's Degree in Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. MG Frank's awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, the Combat Infantry Badge, the Ranger Tab, Air Assault Badge and Parachutist Badge, and the Expert Infantryman Badge.

James Herdel :

Senior Enlisted Leader, Fleet Master Chief | Fleet Master Chief James Herdel currently serves as the 15th Command Senior Enlisted Leader, U.S. Central Command, MacDill AFB, Florida and is the 32nd Master Blaster Of The Navy. FLTCM Herdel grew up in Morganfield, Kentucky. He enlisted in the United States Navy in June 1989 and subsequently completed Electricians Mate "A" school. He attended both Navy Scuba Diver training and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Apprentice School in Florida in June 1990. In 1993, FLTCM attended Basic EOD Technician School in Indian Head, Maryland. FLTCM Herdel has multiple operational tours throughout his career to include five separate tours at Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit (EODMU) 2 in Virginia Beach, VA covering numerous deployments with the U.S. Army 1st Battalion 28th Infantry Regiment, 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Seal Team 8; EODMU 5 in Agana, Guam serving on the first Command Special Operations Detachment; EODMU 6 in Virginia Beach where he deployed as the Operations Master Chief for Commander, Task Group (CTG) 56.1 and 52.3 Bahrain. He then deployed as the Command Master Chief (CMC) of CTG 56.1 and 52.3. While with EODMU2 as the CMC of CTG 56.1 and 52.3, they earned first Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) Battle "E" commendation awarded to the command. FLTCM Herdel has completed the following shore tours: Air Operations Department Head at

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Training and Evaluation Unit 2, Ft. Story, Virginia; Military Freefall Instructor (MFFI-578) in Yuma, Arizona; and Expeditionary Warfighting Development Center. In October 2016, the Commander of Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) selected FLTCM Herdel to become their Force Master Chief. Most recently, U.S. Central Command selected him as the first United States Navy Master Chief named as the United States Central Command Senior Enlisted Leader. FLTCM Herdel has completed the following significant military courses: Joint Special Operations University Summit Course, Keystone Course, Naval Postgraduate School Senior Leader Seminar, Executive Leadership Symposium, Naval War College Senior Enlisted Academy, and Command Leadership School. FLTCM Herdel holds a Bachelor's Degree in Business Management from American Military University. FLTCM Herdel is a qualified Master Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician and Freefall Naval Parachutist. His significant awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal (2), Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (5), Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal (9), and Army Achievement Medal. Additionally, he is authorized to wear the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Gold Badge.

CENTCOM Component Commands :

Like all combatant commands, CENTCOM constitutes a headquarters element without any military units permanently assigned to it. CENTCOM operates with Component Commands - one for each of the U.S. armed services, along with a joint special operations component and a number of subordinate joint task forces. A list and short description of each Component Command is provided below:

U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) :

ARCENT is headquartered at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, and has a forward headquarters in Kuwait. Resident in the Middle East for more than 20 years, ARCENT is resourced, postured, and prepared to prevent conflict, preserve stability, shape the area to the benefit of the U.S., and successfully negotiate future contingencies. ARCENT, in addition to being CENTCOM's U.S. Army component, also serves as the Coalition Forces Land Component Command.

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) :

NAVCENT has its headquarters in Manama, Bahrain, the home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet. NAVCENT forces in the region normally include an Expeditionary Strike Group and standing maritime forces tailored to regional missions. NAVCENT also serves as the command element for the Combined Maritime Forces, which is composed of naval forces from about 30 nations that are responsible for combating terrorism, piracy, illegal drug trafficking, and freedom of navigation and commerce in the region.

U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) :

AFCENT is headquartered at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina and has a forward headquarters in Qatar. As the air component of CENTCOM, AFCENT is responsible for air operations, either unilaterally or in concert with coalition partners, and for developing contingency plans in support of

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Stakeholders (continued)

national objectives for CENTCOM's 20-nation area of responsibility.

U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command (MARCENT) :

MARCENT has its headquarters on MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. As the Marine Corps component for CENTCOM, MARCENT is responsible for all Marine Corps forces in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. MARCENT provides Marine expeditionary forces capable of conducting a wide range of operations, offering the command a responsive and unique set of capabilities.

U.S. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) :

SOCCENT is headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida and maintains a forward headquarters in Qatar. SOCCENT employs Special Operations capabilities in partnership with U.S. government agencies, regional security forces, and CENTCOM component forces to enable and support the goals and objectives of CENTCOM.

USCENTCOM Coalition :

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Coalition at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB) in Tampa, Florida, is one of the largest military coalitions in U.S. history. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the coalition began to form with a common purpose – to fight terrorism. “Beginning on Sept. 12, having worked our way to a plan, which we executed or started to execute on Oct. 7, by the time we reached the end of September, we had a coalition here in Tampa of senior national representatives of some 15 or so nations,” said Army Gen. Tommy Franks, CENTCOM Commander in 2001. Since those early days the number of Coalition nations has grown to its present number of 44 nations, who are represented at CENTCOM. Members have contributed to many named campaigns to include: Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Resolute Support and Operation Inherent Resolve, to name a few. The strength and importance of the CENTCOM Coalition has continued for more than a decade. Having coalition members in Tampa has proved invaluable and helped ensure focused coordination and synchronization. Coalition forces have made important contributions to fight terrorism across the spectrum of operations. Particular contributions include, but are not limited to, providing vital intelligence, personnel, equipment and assets for use on the ground, air and sea. Coalition members also have provided liaison teams, participated in planning, provided bases and granted over-flight permissions – as well as sizable contributions of humanitarian assistance. The CENTCOM Coalition nations are working to promote peace and stability in CENTCOM's area of responsibility and beyond. Their contributions are an example of how the international community is working together to enhance capabilities, share information, and address destabilizing issues in the region.

CENTCOM Coalition Nations

Afghanistan

Japan

Qatar

Albania

Jordan

Romania

Armenia

Kazakhstan

Saudi Arabia

Australia

Korea

Singapore

Belgium

Kuwait

Slovak Republic

Bulgaria

Kyrgyzstan

Slovenia

Canada

Latvia

Spain

Croatia

Lebanon

Sweden

Czech Republic

Lithuania

Turkey

Denmark

Mongolia

Uzbekistan

Egypt

Morocco

Ukraine

Estonia

Netherlands

United Arab Emirates

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Stakeholders (continued)

Finland

New Zealand

United Kingdom

France

Norway

Germany

Pakistan

Hungary

Poland

Italy

Portugal

Vision

Regional security and stability

Mission

To direct and enable military operations and activities with allies and partners to increase regional security and stability in support of enduring U.S. interests.

Values

Partnership

Security

Stability

1. Iran

Deter Iran

Stakeholder(s)

Iran :

While periods of decreased tension may provide the illusion of a return to normalcy, ample intelligence exists indicating the Iranian regime's desire to continue malign operations that threaten lives, disrupt the internal matters of sovereign nations, and threaten freedom of navigation, regional commerce, global energy supplies, and the global economy. CENTCOM recognizes that so long as the United States continues to apply diplomatic and economic pressure against Iran, the Joint Force must be postured to deter Iran from using the military element of power to counter our actions. While our steady-state posture does not require offensive forces in theater to achieve overmatch or unintentionally provoke Iran's regime, our presence sends a clear and unambiguous signal of our capabilities and, most importantly, the will to defend partners and U.S. national interests. This exemplifies the concept of deterrence.

Iraq :

Since May 2019, Iranian-supported groups in Iraq have attacked U.S. interests dozens of times and conducted scores of unmanned aerial system (UAS) reconnaissance flights

near U.S. and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) bases... In early January, Iran launched more than a dozen ballistic missiles in a deliberate attack against U.S. and Coalition forces in Iraq. This state-sponsored missile attack, in response to the U.S. killing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani crossed a threshold compared to previous "grey-zone" attacks and may set a lower bar for future actions by the regime.

Saudi Arabia :

The Iranian regime has attacked or seized foreign vessels in the Gulf, facilitated attacks by Houthi forces from Yemen into Saudi Arabia, continued to export lethal aid to destabilizing groups throughout the region including those aiming to attack Israel, supported the Assad regime's brutal conflict against its own people, and carried out an unprecedented cruise missile and UAS attack in September against Saudi oil facilities that destabilized international energy markets.

The long-term challenges we face in the CENTCOM AOR are the destabilizing and escalatory actions of the Iranian regime. The Iranian regime's quest for nuclear weapons, coupled with its hegemonic ambitions, misbehavior, and threats to the United States and its regional partners have been consistent elements of its policy for decades. Deterring Iran from its destructive and destabilizing activities in the military domain underpins everything we do, and is CENTCOM's top priority. Until such a time as the regime in Tehran decides to be a responsible member of the international community, CENTCOM must work to establish and maintain military deterrence with Iran, notably within the context of the ongoing economic and diplomatic maximum pressure campaign.

2.1. Will

Demonstrate our will

Deterrence is not a military concept, but a diplomatic and political construct obtained from the effect demonstrated capabilities have on the mind of a potential opponent. Deterrence can be contested – Iran's regime retains the ability to interfere with our efforts to deter. Historically, Iran has never doubted the U.S. capability to respond, but frustrates our ability to do so by focusing on deniable, hard to attribute activities. Targeting the Kata'ib Hezbollah group and Soleimani clearly demonstrated U.S. will.

2.2. Capability

Maintain bases, forces, and activities

Our posture – the bases, forces, and activities that we undertake – maintains the other half of the deterrence equation: capability. Reduction of U.S. forces in the AOR combined with a perception of U.S. disinterest in the Middle East fueled thinking in Iran in the spring of 2019 that the U.S. was no longer committed to defending our national interests in the region. That misperception led directly to the cycle of escalation that crested in January 2020. In order to maintain the contested deterrence our recent military actions have re-established, Iran's regime must continue to see the U.S. has enough forward-deployed forces for a credible military capability, that we are

willing to employ that capability for defense of U.S. interests with conviction, and any decision to contest our actions will not yield a positive outcome.

2.3. Posture

Posture forces to achieve a sustained state of deterrence

Deterrence can be difficult to establish and measure, and costly to maintain. CENTCOM prosecutes numerous missions simultaneously, scattered across the breadth and depth of the region, all in areas suffused with Iranian-backed forces continuing their decades-long struggles against us. While the cost of regaining and maintaining deterrence is expensive, it is less expensive than the deployment of forces required to fight in full-scale conflict: the failure of deterrence. CENTCOM's objective is therefore to posture forces with operational depth in the region to achieve a sustained state of deterrence against Iran's regime without undue provocation, and to be adaptable to future Iranian threats while the U.S. maximum pressure campaign continues. In addition to posture, a key part of deterrence is intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). While presence can fluctuate based on deterrence needs, consistent ISR is necessary to identify subtle changes that shape posture and ensure we align our presence appropriately.

2. Afghanistan

Negotiate Resolution of the Conflict in Afghanistan

Stakeholder(s)

Afghanistan

representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad.

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad :

CENTCOM efforts support the U.S. South Asia Strategy and remain fully aligned with the efforts of U.S. Special Rep-

All wars must have a political end. Reconciliation between the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan represents the best option for bringing the 18-year-long fight in Afghanistan to a favorable conclusion, while meeting long-term U.S. security requirements.

2.1. Terrorist Attacks

Prevent terrorist attacks against the homeland from Afghanistan and Central Asia

Our military mission in Afghanistan continues in support of our overriding national interest: preventing terrorist attacks against the homeland from Afghanistan and Central Asia. Safeguarding this means we must remain focused on retaining a counterterrorism platform under any of the multiple political eventualities that may take shape. U.S. Forces-Afghanistan continues to examine efficiencies in force structure to reduce our military footprint and reduce costs while maintaining counterterrorism pressure on VEOs and provisioning the capability to do so in the future.

2.2. Military Assistance

Help the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces

We also continue to help the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces develop and refine their force generation processes for campaign sustainability. Without continued pressure, groups such as the Islamic State-Khorasan (ISIS-K) will regain the ability to mount or sponsor a transnational terrorist attack within a few years. Your support to our critical authorities such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Funding, Commander's Emergency Response Program, Coalition Support Fund, and others have remained paramount during this transition.

Stakeholder(s):

Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces

3. ISIS

Maintain Defeat-ISIS Campaign in Syria and Iraq

Stakeholder(s)

Syria :

Syria remains a dynamic situation with multiple parties and agendas involved. The Syrian regime, with support from Russia and Iran, continues to seek a military victory. We are seeing this play out in northwest Syria as the Assad regime, Russian, and Iranian campaign of violence has escalated since December, resulting in almost one million more displaced persons, innumerable people injured or killed, with many more in critical need of assistance, and dangerous clashes between our NATO ally Turkey and the Syrian regime. We likewise see the Assad regime continuing its use of chemical weapons in blatant violation of its commitments to the Chemical Weapons Convention – deterring this use in the future remains a CENTCOM priority. In eastern Syria, U.S. and Coalition forces under command of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve assist with

ensuring the lasting defeat of ISIS, including safeguarding energy sources to prevent their seizure by ISIS for revenue generation.

Russia

Iran

ISIS :

Despite the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October, ISIS remains a threat in Syria, with most of its activity focused on reestablishing networks; assassinating and intimidating local leaders and security forces; and extending its influence in rural areas throughout eastern Syria and Iraq.

Similar to Afghanistan, most of the U.S. intelligence community predicts that without sustained pressure levied against it, ISIS has the potential to reconstitute in Iraq and Syria in short order, beyond the current capabilities of the U. S. to neutralize it without a capable, partnered ground force.

3.1. Turkey, SDF & Russia

Continue to support Turkey and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) while maintaining deconfliction with Russia

Moving forward, we must continue our support to NATO ally Turkey and our D-ISIS partner force, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while maintaining deconfliction with Russia, which, along with the Assad regime, aggressively challenges the Coalition mission in various ways.

Stakeholder(s):

Turkey

Russia

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)

3.2. Iraq

Develop and enable the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to contain and defeat ISIS

Iraq remains a strategic partner in the fight against ISIS and is key human and geographic terrain... Given ISIS' demonstrated tenacity and ability to reconstitute, we cannot afford to divert focus from the D-ISIS mission, understanding that the territorial defeat of ISIS does not mean the absence of ISIS. The years ahead will not be bloodless. Attacks may continue in the form of an insurgency, but the goal is to develop and enable the ability of the Iraqi Security Forces to contain and defeat ISIS without external assistance.

Stakeholder(s):

Iraq :

We remain in Iraq at the request of the Government of Iraq (GoI) for one mission: the defeat of ISIS.

ization Forces more beholden to Iran's regime than the GoI. Some of these militias smuggle advanced weapons into Iraq from Iran, not to defend the country from ISIS, but to undermine existing security and threaten U.S. and Coalition forces partnered with the GoI.

Iraqi Security Forces

Iran :

Hindering our ability to work with the ISF toward this objective are rogue elements of the Popular Mobil-

4. Unmanned Aircraft

Counter the UAS Threat

Countering the UAS Threat. ~ In the aggregate, the U.S. maintains air dominance across the AOR but lacks a comprehensive joint solution to counter the growing Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) threat. Inexpensive and easy to proliferate, UASs provide adversaries the operational ability to surveil, target, and attack U.S. and partner facilities, providing the means to engage in mass-casualty or large-scale, critical infrastructure attacks with cheap, off-the-shelf technology while affording deniability and a disproportionately high return on investment.

4.1. Networks

Develop networked capabilities to counter UAS

CENTCOM employs current systems and tactics to best equip and enable U.S. forces to meet this challenge, but the growing threat posed by UASs, coupled with our lack of dependable, networked capabilities to counter them is the most concerning tactical development in the CENTCOM AOR since the rise of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED).

4.2. Science & Technology

Mobilize funding of Science and Technology

Just as the IED threat galvanized operational, industrial and scientific communities in the U.S. toward the development of solutions like the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP), we are fast approaching a juncture requiring a similar mobilization to counter the UAS threat. Your support and funding of Science and Technology is vital to our success in the Great Power Competition.

5. IDPs & Refugees

Counter the weaponization of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.

Stakeholder(s)

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

Refugees

Weaponization of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and Refugees.

5.1. Stability & Security

Set the conditions for stability and security necessary for these populations to return to their original homes and begin the process of regaining power over their own lives

There is no known, successful methodology of de-radicalization for hard-core ISIS believers. This radicalized population currently numbers in the thousands and preys on the disenfranchised and weak IDP and refugee populations already highly susceptible to extremist indoctrination. The longer these IDPs remain in refugee camps, the more likely they are to become radicalized. While there is no military solution for de-radicalization, the military can set the conditions for stability and security necessary for these populations to return to their original homes and begin the process of regaining power over their own lives. The sheer number of IDPs and refugees presents a challenge to the timeline along which necessary levels of long-term stabilization can take root.

Stakeholder(s):

IDPs :

The manipulation or co-opting of IDPs and refugees by an adversary to gain a political, military, or economic advantage is not historically uncommon.

ogy is an alarming development with potentially generational implications.

Syria

Iraq

ISIS :

However, in vast swaths of Syria and Iraq the systematic indoctrination of IDP and refugee camp populations who are hostages to the receipt of ISIS ideol-

5.2. SDF Detention Facilities

Mitigate the risks associated with foreign-terrorist fighters in SDF detention facilities

The United States can mitigate the risks associated with these populations by facilitating repatriations, training and equipping guard forces, and providing the funding required to improve prison infrastructure.

Stakeholder(s):

Syria :

Also concerning are near- and long-term implications of SDF detention facilities in Syria and the disposition of foreign-terrorist fighters (FTFs). While CENTCOM and our coalition partners are working to address and mitigate security challenges at the

facilities, this serves only as a tactical-level band-aid, not a long-term solution.

SDF

5.2.1. Repatriations

Facilitate repatriations

Ultimately, the best way to alleviate this problem is to reduce the numbers of detainees through repatriation. The ISIS detainee and IDP populations represent more than 60 nations. While some countries have made efforts to reclaim their foreign fighters, full resolution requires a comprehensive diplomatic and international effort. This problem will not go away by ignoring it, and can only be addressed by the international community working together to accept its shared responsibilities.

5.2.2. Guard Forces

Training and equipping guard forces

5.2.3. Prisons

Provide funding to improve prison infrastructure

5.3. SIVs

Increase Special Immigrant Visas in Afghanistan and stabilization funding

As noted, military solutions do not exist for the issues of de-radicalization and repatriation of FTFs. They are international problems requiring international solutions. The longer these conditions persist; the IDP population becomes more and more ensconced in ISIS philosophy creating a petri dish of future terrorists. Action now by the international community is imperative to protect our homeland and our allies. Left unchecked, these issues are a ticking time bomb with the potential to spark the resurgence of ISIS, despite the destruction of the physical caliphate we and our allies and partners have worked so hard to accomplish. Your support to increase Special Immigrant Visas in Afghanistan and stabilization funding is much appreciated by me, our troops, and our partners.

Stakeholder(s):
Afghanistan

Administrative Information

Start Date:

End Date:

Publication Date: 2021-09-30

Source: <https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/>

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PDF formatted using TopLeaf XML publisher

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